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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950284-CA
SIXTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

Priority No. 15

Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 782a-3(g) Utah Code Annptated (1994) , in that this case is an appeal
of a judgment of forfeiture in the District Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Appellant's Point One is that the trial court erred

in finding the subject currency susceptible to forfeiture.

"The

proper construction of the Utah Controlled Substances Act is a
question of law."

State of Utah v. One 1984 Oldgmobile and One

Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Dollars in
United States Currency, 892 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1995) (citing State v.
A House & 1.37 Acres of Real Property Located at 392 South 600
East, Nephi. 886 P.2d 534, 537 (Utah 1994)).

This Court shall

therefore grant no particular deference to the district court's
rulings.

Rather it should review them for correctness.

State v.

One 1984 Oldsmobile. 892 P.2d

1042, 1044

(citing World Peace

Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp,, 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah
1994)); accord Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah
1990).
2.

Appellant's Point Two is that the trial court erred

by making inadequate findings of fact. The standard for review as
to Point Two, is one of correctness. Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d
474, 477 (Utah App. 1991).
3.

Appellant's Point Three is that the Court erred by

refusing to grant a continuance.

The standard for review as to

Point Three, as an abuse of discretion is a clearly erroneous
standard.

A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no

reasonable basis for the decision."
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
be reversed
classified

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch..

A trial court's determination will

if the ruling is so unreasonable that it can be
as arbitrary

and

capricious

or

a clear

abuse of

discretion. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993);
Radcliffe v. Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah App. 1994).
Appellant asserts due process grounds for seeking review of
the issues above which were not preserved in the trial court.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property.

U.S.

,

114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Appellant asserts the Utah Supreme Court's decision in In re:
One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 823 P.2d 468
(Utah 1992) is dispositive of this matter.

Appellant suggests

further that the United States Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v.
James Daniel Good Real Property
2

U.S.

, 114 S.Ct. 492

(1993) is likewise dispositive of this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a judgment dotted January 31, 1995 of
forfeiture of sixteen thousand dollars in U.S. currency.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On February 24, 1994, Utah Highway Patrol officers made a
traffic stop of a 1988 Hyundai automobile in Grand County, Utah.
Sixteen thousand dollars in cash was found in the car's bumper. On
September

27,

1994, Grand

County

Attorney

William

L. Benge

commenced a forfeiture action pursuant to provisions of § 58-37-13
Utah Code Annotated.

Several days prior to the complaint being

filed, an attorney from Van Nuys, California had written Mr. Benge
to inquire of the status of the matter.

On November 2, 1994,

Mr. Benge corresponded with Mr. Hammond, informing him that a
hearing had been set for December 7, 1994.

On December 2, 1994

Isidro Garcia filed a pro se response to claimant's complaint. The
hearing set for December 6, 1994 was continued until January 25,
1995.

Prior to the hearing, Mr. Garcia, through Mr. Hammond,

requested that the matter be continued.

The matter was not

continued, a default hearing was conducted, and judgment was
subsequently entered for claimant on January 31, 1995.
Counsel for Appellant filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b) on March 1,
1995.

Notice of Appeal was filed on March 2, 1995.

This matter

was heard before the Seventh District Court on April 5, 1995. The
Motion for Relief was denied.
C.

DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
3

Final judgment of forfeiture was entered by the trial court on
January 31, 1995.
D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant appeals from the final order of the Court which
forfeits sixteen thousand

dollars

in United

Appellant was not present nor represented

States

currency.

at the evidentiary

hearing at which the District Court found that the subject currency
was subject to forfeiture pursuant to the provisions of S 58-37-13,
Utah Code Annotated (1993).

Transcript at 3, 4.

This matter had

previously been continued at the instance of the Grand County
Attorney.

Transcript at 3.

California

An attorney licensed to practice in

(but not a member of Utah's bar) had requested a

continuance two days prior to the scheduled (continued) hearing to
affiliate with local counsel or to become admitted pro hac
Transcript at 3,4.

vice.

This request was denied, and the matter went

forward as a default proceeding.

Transcript at 4.

Only the

investigative officer, Trooper Darrel Mecam testified.

Transcript

at 4-10.
No attempt was made by the state to prove that the money came
from or was intended to be used in a drug transaction in this
state. Transcript at 4-10. No criminal charges were filed against
either of the occupants of the vehicle from which the currency was
seized.

Transcript at 4-10.

at the hearing.

No physical evidence was introduced

Transcript at 4-10.

No laboratory results were

offered or received into evidence Transcript at 4-10.
On February 24, 1994, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Darrel Mecam
was on patrol in his vehicle on Interstate 70 in Grand County,
Utah.

Transcript at 5.

He observed a 1988 Hyundai automobile
4

travelling westbound at 7 6 mph.

He effectuated a traffic stop.

Transcr
Troopers Mecam and Porter (who was patrolling with Mecam)
engaged the occupants of t

Hyundai i
-

Trooper

__ _ _

:onversation

Transcript

sidro Gar

herei/i) for his driver's 1 icense

' registration, Transcript a t 5.

Trooper

the

Mecam

likewise

asked

passenger

identified t h e owner of t h e stopped vehicle.
Trooper M e c a m detected
< I' "i

""111"1!

produce

Transcript -**" 6. Neil" II" i

identification, which h e

Transcript

I

ncupant

T r a n s c r i p t a t 6.

of alcohol from t h e passenger.

Ixoopers received ronf lief i nq stxiir i i'/i l"i mn

the occupants about from w h e r e they w e r e driving.

Transcript at 6.

Trooper M e c a m learned from Grand County dispatch t h a t the passenger
had pri or control] e< :1 substance charges

n

Transcr

rooper

Mecam asked M r . Garcia i ( I lie jar w a s stolen, w h e r e h e h a d been,
whether h e h a d hauled controlled substances in t h e ar t o Chicago,
and whether t h e r e were c i i) firearms ::>:i : large sums
vehicle.

Mr. Garcia answered

1 questions.

Transcript

Trooper Mecam next "obtained a consent to search the e
veh11 1

' Transcript at 7.

The officers placed the occupants

handcuffs sc t:l: .ej could commence the search

Transcript at

Trooper Porter searched the interior portion, Trooper Mecam search
exterior ni I II

eJiicl "i

Trooper Mecam detected an odor n ^

burnt marijuana coming from within the vehicle.

Transcript at

Trooper Mecam suspected there was a hidden compartment
bumper.

Transcript a I : 8

H a pulled the rubber covering

bumper and discovered two metal compartments, approximately
5

* -

inches

long.

compartments

Transcript

at 8.

and discovered

He opened the ends of the

a Browning

.22 rifle,

cash, and

••marijuana residue" inside. Transcript at 8. Trooper Mecam asked
Isidro Garcia about the gun and the money.

Mr. Garcia answered,

•'yes, that it was money that he had derived from the sale of drugs
and the rifle was his." Transcript at 9.
Trooper Mecam further testified that the marijuana residue
tested positive for marijuana, and that an unidentified Grand
County Detective "perform(ed) a sniff of the vehicle or the money
or the gun or compartment," and that "they alerted on both the car
and the money." Transcript at 9, 10.
There was no testimony elicited about where any purported drug
transaction occurred. There was no evidence presented that either
occupant of the vehicle which had been stopped for speeding was
made aware of rights afforded pursuant to
U.S. 436

(1966).

Miranda v Arizona. 384

There was no evidence about the facts and

circumstances surrounding the "consent" to search.

There was no

evidence about the duration of the stop, or the process by which
the Troopers determined that a search was necessary.

There was no

evidence of the disposition of the individuals involved, whether
they were arrested, or charged with any criminal offense.
The Court found that the State had sustained its burden of
showing that the defendant currency was the product of violation of
the controlled substances laws of Utah.

Transcript at 10.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case begins with the routine traffic stop of a westbound
vehicle travelling interstate through Grand County, Utah, and ends
6

with sixteen thousand dollars being forfeited to the state.
r o r < i i 11

l ( jI

mi "

i"" " » •

''I

""

,:*;:

record is void of an>

i""i I

mi mi in

I

it i n 1

111

The

111 ni

between the currency and violation

Utah Law.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE
SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE.
Appea
U.S.

ixi re One Hundred "*"I wo Thousand Dollars ii i

Currency, 823 P.2d 468 (Utah 1992) for the proposition that

secreted currency t * - • subject to forfeiture absent evidence that
tend' = I t :: • k = " is = ::i :i i :t i „ i r i j
transaction within Utah.
' In that case, in ider facts similar t ::: the instant case,
")

C ; ; i i i; 11; _)

because

< i j j, • mi in, i )

:i t: was spewing

: i I I i 11 j L £

smoke.

i • i i ) p | > ts "i i

823

:i

• .ii i in < ;• i i • » ,i i 1111 e i :b 1

P. 2d at 4 59.

The

deputy

discovered that the vehicle carried two fuel tanks, one of which

arrestee

tn*

drivei

*

driving

impounded th-- vehicle.
se-i

nil1,

- -

,in

suspended

license

Officers then obtained a search warrant,
I

11",

i vi' i ij11

ij if i t> h i i i i a i v I ,'

" I

A, drug dog alerted on t„l-v"3 currency

the false fuel tank.

charges were filed against any of the occupants of the vehicle.
I In

. l i i p n . HI I '

and

11 II

I in

11 I

•

;

.

• •

.

'

•

W e find it unnecessary to comment on the sufficiency of
the evidence because a basic element of a cause of action
for forfeiture is absent. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (l)g)
provides that the following are subject to forfeiture:
"everything of value furnished or intended to be
furnished in exchange for a controlled substance iii
violation of this act, all proceeds traceable to any
violation of this act, and all monies, negotiable
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used
to facilitate any violation of this act , ,
,"
The
statute thus provides for the forfeiture of currency only
when it has been used or was intended to be used to
7

Id.

facilitate a violation of the act. It is not enough that
the
currency
may have
been
generated
in
a
drug
transaction
which took place outside
of Utah.
(emphasis
added). In that case, there would be no violation of the
Utah act. It is only when the Utah act is violated that
drug proceeds are subject to forfeiture under Section 5837-13(1). Here, no attempt was made by the State to
prove that the money came from or was intended to be used
in a drug transaction in this state.
No controlled
substances were found in the van or on the person of any
of the occupants. No criminal charges were filed against
any of them. The van was merely passing through Utah on
an interstate highway.
The judgment cannot be sustained due to the lack of
an element of forfeiture.
Id.

at 469-70.

1042, 1045

See also,

State v. One 1984 Oldsmobile,

(Utah 1995).

892 P.2d

As was the case in One Hundred Two

Thousand Dollars, the State in the case sub judice

made no attempt

to prove that the money came from or was intended to be used in a
drug transaction in Utah. The district court herein erred when it
granted the state's petition for forfeiture of the currency.
POINT TWO:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING INADEQUATE FINDINGS
OF FACT

Rule 52 (a) , UTAH R. CIV. P., provides that M[i]n all actions
tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon . . . ."
*consistently
fact./M

"Utah appellate courts

stress7 the importance of adequate

* findings of

Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) (citing

State v. Viail, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1991)).

M

To succeed

in challenging the findings, appellant must prove that they are
clearly erroneous, i.e.,
Id.

at 477.

against the clear weight of the evidence."

(citations omitted).

Therefore,

if we are to

determine whether the evidence adduced at trial supports the trial
court's findings, the findings must embody sufficient detail and
8

include enough subsidiary facts

adequate

findings

of

fact,

:learly show the evidence upon

meaningful

review

evidentiary basis is virtually impossible. ,;
omitted) .

decision's

Id.

citations

The

i

Co. , 77 6 P, 2d 896 „, 899

i cvi^al

Reid v. Mutual gf Omaha Ins.

the trial court's reasoning process.

ITlfi.

of

(lit .ah 1989); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P. 2d

1 338 (Ut ! I i 1 S • 3 9)
"The process of marshalling the evidence serves the important

function of reminding litigants and appellate courts of the Lroad
deference owed I

I In hi I I iiinlli i

I I i i Il

Woodward,

H ? i III1

"

(quoting State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App.1990
"However, w*.

grant this deference when

findings

fa
fc

court"

*clear1
"

lecision.*

*

incontroverted!\

t.

"Unless the

support[s '

tne

trial

record
court's

!

•

requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court."
a t

1

'

"i

Her

•

i»

I In

•

•'•

.

i i in ni i

.

•

:

''

'

'

ni ni mi ml i i n | i w v

I P

'•

,i

•

ni

mi mi 1*1 :

The Court finds that the State has sustained its burden
of showing that the defendant vehicle and the defendant
currency were the product of violation of the controlled
substances laws of this state and that they are
forfeitable to the State of Utah to be used as provided
by law, and the Court will enter an order of forfeiture.

disclose the evidentiary basis for the Court
they

sufficiently

reveal the court 7 s

9

reasoning

decision, nor
process,

Id.

court.
POINT THREE:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED

IN REFUSING

TO GRANT A

CONTINUANCE
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall . . .

be

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.H
"Our precedents establish the general rule that individuals must
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government
deprives them of property.11 Id.

at 498 (citing United States v.

$8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n. 12 (1983), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 82 (1972), Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S.
337 (1969), Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950)). "Although Congress designed the drug forfeiture
statute to be a powerful instrument in enforcement of the drug
laws, it did not intend to deprive innocent owners of their
property. The affirmative defense of innocent ownership is allowed
by statute." Id.
to

ensure

the

at 501.

"The purpose of an adversary hearing is

requisite

neutrality

governmental decisionmaking.

that

must

inform

all

That protection is of particular

importance here, where the government has a direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the proceeding." Id.
procedures are not confined to the innocent.

at 502.

"Fair

The question before

us is the legality of the seizure, not the strength of the
Governments case." Id.

at 505.

Here, the record shows that the monies seized had been in the
possession of the State of Utah from February 24, 1994 until
September 27, 1994 without a petition for forfeiture by the State
even being filed.

The matter had been continued once at the
10

request nl the St ri 1 e
1T

The claimant, Isidro Garcia had filed a pro

I
l I III

asserted a claim to the funds.

The record also reflects that the

Court considered a Motion to Continue, which was denied without
possession "m
funds

^

monies would disappear

otherwise b<*

unavailable

future date.
-in i

The state could

I
l 11u 1,1 ni "i

I InI. i; L a i m a n t

w i entitled c .: a i . . » .

i n hearing on the merits, of which

WH

^ * *u-

deprived

^

constitutional right to
liscretior

e

refusing

continuance.
CONCLUSION
reverse the
decision of the trial court, or should remand the matter for
additional proceedings.
U e b i j o i . ' l I ii I I |

ill mi I I I i il M M . J2_.

''h

Ml

'Vii(ju

I,

lli'.)5.
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Case is State of Utah versus $16,000,

civil number 9407-59.
MR. BENGE:

Your Honor, in this matter our records

don't indicate that there was ever a claim made pursuant to the
statute by the person with the property interest in this
property.

We are prepared to proceed, however.
THE COURT:

The record will show that this matter

has been continued twice before, once on the request of the
prosecution because the witnesses were not available, the
State's witnesses were unavailable on that day, and then again
because someone had contacted the State, a possible claimant had
contacted the State.

The State had wished to give them an

additional six weeks to make a claim if they desired to do so.
MS. STARLEY:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, which claim are we on?

$16,000.

The Court has received by fax two days ago a
document signed by a Barry Hammond, which gives no indication
that Mr. Hammond is a licensed member of the Utah State Bar.
The case numbers are wrong, but they are the same numbers that
were in some of the pleadings filed by the State, so I would
excuse that.

It's entitled People of the State of California

versus $16,000 and the 1988 Hyundai.
MR. BENGE:

Your Honor, just for the record, I am

aware that -- I would state that that does not comply with the

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, DONNA J. RICHINS, CSR, RPR

4

Utah rules of pleadings, which require a bar number.

I have no

evidence that Mr. Hammond is a member of the Utah State Bar.
And I would state that when he contacted our office
approximately two months ago to ask for a continuance of this
matter, he was told or reminded that he would need an associate
from the Utah Council if he wanted to proceed (inaudible).
doesn't seem he has done that.

So I would ask that his —

It
that

faxed claim be struck and we would proceed in default.
THE COURT:

That request is granted.

I suppose you

would like to consolidate this with the next case —
MR. BENGE:

Yes, I would.

THE COURT:

—

the State of Utah versus the Hyundai,

We will also call civil number 9407-60, the same evidence in
both those cases at a consolidated hearing.
Call your witness, Mr. Benge.
MR. BENGE:

Thank you.

May we proceed?

THE COURT: Yes.
DARREL MECAM,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, having
been first duly sworn to testify, testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BENGE:
Q.

State your name, please.

A.

Darrel Mecam.

Q.

How are you employed?
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A.

Utah Highway Patrol.

Q.

Calling your attention to the 24th day of February

of this year, did you have contact with one 1988 Hyundai motor
vehicle?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What were the circumstances?

A.

I was patrolling with Trooper Glenn Porter.

Peterson was eastbound for Colorado.

Trooper

He called to advise he had

just observed a vehicle coming west at a high rate of speed,
activated his radar, said it was 88 miles an hour, could not
cross the median, and had me watch for the said vehicle.
At 179 a small, dark car came by at 7 6 miles an hour.

I

proceeded through the median to catch up to the vehicle.
Q.

What happened when you —

Did you ultimately stop

the vehicle?
A.

Yes.

As it come up behind me in the lane change

without signaling, I activated my lights and summoned it to the
roadside.
Q.

What then happened?

A.

Trooper Porter approached the window, asked for a

driver's license and registration.
ID.

The driver had no picture

He produced a title to the car, and I don't believe he

could produce any ID with any kind of picture or anything like
that.
Q.

What then happened?
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A.

I asked the passenger if he had any identification,

which he did.

I gave this to Trooper Porter.

Porter needed one

of them -- names or anything, match anything to the vehicle or
anything with the vehicle.

And I distinctly remember asking the

passenger who the car belonged to.

He stated he did not know.

Also the driver didn't know who owned the car.
Q.

What did you then do?

A.

While talking to the passenger, the odor of alcholic

beverage was present on him.

I could smell that.

passenger where he was coming from.

I asked the

He said the driver had

driven up from California and picked him up in Fort Morgan
because he was out of work and needed a ride home.

In talking

to the driver, he stated he had been to Chicago, was on his way
home and picked up Istophal (phonetic) hitchhiking.
Q.

What did you then do?

A.

Run a check through dispatch on both subjects.

believe I ran it through Grand County.

I

Our dispatch for some

reason was down, 1038, computer was down.

It showed that

Istophal (phonetic) had a III showing previous controlled
subtance charges.
THE COURT:

Who is Istophal (phonetic)?

THE WITNESS:

He was the passenger.

Q.

(By Mr. Benge)

After finding out that, what did you

A.

I approached Isidro on the fact that he didn't know

do?
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who the car belonged to or anything and asked him if possibly
the car was stolen.

Isidro stated that it was not,

I asked

Isidro where he had been, if possibly he had hauled controlled
substance in the car to Chicago.

He stated no.

I asked if

there were any firearms or large sums of money, which he also
stated no.
Q.

What did you then do?

A.

I obtained a consent to search the entire vehicle.

He said —
Q.

Did you do that?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What did you do and what were the results of that?

A.

I had Istophal (phonetic) and Isidro stand in the

front of the vehicle off the side of the road.

On opening the

door you could immediately smell the odor of burnt marijuana
coming from within the vehicle.

Due to the fact that it was

cold, I hadn't noticed that before.
were up.

The windows on the vehicle

Looking through the vehicle, as Trooper Porter was

going through the passenger (inaudible), I walked around the
back side, did kneel down, looked underneath the bumper.
a rubber covered bumper.

It had

The screws, the molding screws in that

all appeared to have been recently removed and replaced, had
fresh marks on them.
Q.

What then happened?

A.

I looked under -- I then grabbed a blanket, laid
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down on the road, crawled under to look at the inside of the
bumper.

There are usually some holes for the absorption if

there is an impact.

The holes were not there.

apparently been welded over or removed.

They had

I suspected then there

was a hidden compartment in the bumper.
Q.

What then happened?

A.

Due to the fact that I was going to have to crawl

under the vehicle and take it out, compromise myself, we did
place the subjects in handcuffs at that time due to the fact I
would need Trooper Porter's help while I was under the car.
pulled the rubber covering off.

I

As I did this, two metal

compartments fell out of the bumper.
Q.

Describe these compartments that fell out.

A.

They were, oh, approximately about 30, 35 inches

long, and they had an open end to the middle.
were in the center.

The open ends

They had cardboard over the ends, and they

were taped over, and they had been formed to fit right along the
bumper support.
Q.

What then happened?

A.

I opened the ends of the compartment.

I just

removed the cardboard and discovered a Browning .22 rifle
secreted inside, along with a quantity of cash, and when I
removed that, you could see marijuana residue in the
compartment.
Q.

Did you question the driver about the gun or the
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money?
A.

I asked Isidro about the gun and the money and asked

if it was his.

He stated yes, that it was his.

I asked him if

Lz was involved with the sale or purchase of drugs, and he
stated yes, that it was money that he had derived from the sale
of drugs and the rifle was his.
Q.

With regard to the marijuana residue that you said

you found also inside the compartment that you found money and
the gun, did you or any other officer cause that to be tested
for marijuana?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know who performed that test?

A.

Trooper John Kelly.

Q.

Do you know the results of that test?

A.

They were positive.

Q.

Did you also have any person, any drug dog handler

come and perform a sniff of the vehicle or the money or the gun
or compartment?
A.

I did contact Grand County.

Q.

Did that happen?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Was that done in your presence?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And what were the results?

A.

Positive.

Detective --

He indicated they alerted on both the car
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and the money.
Q.

Is this car and money things that can be used in law

enforcement for either your agency or Grand County?
A.

Yes, it is.
MR. BENGE:

That's all I have of this witness.

THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. BENGE:

I have John McGann, Joe Krissman and

John Kelly here, but I believe I will rest.
THE COURT:

The Court finds that the State has

sustained its burden of showing that the defendant vehicle and
the defendant currency were the product of violation of the
controlled substances laws of this state and that they are
forfeitable to the State of Utah to be used as provided by law,
and the Court will enter an order of forfeiture.
MR. BENGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.
***

THE COURT:

Civil number 9407-80 and 81, The State

of Utah versus the 1988 Nissan Sentra and 31,700 —

570 dollars,

consolidating those for hearing.
Ms. Starley, you are standing.
MS. STARLEY:

I am.

Your Honor, I was contacted

yesterday by Mr. Channel from California.

He —

and I believe

his secretary had contacted the Court and that also the clients
have made a motion for continuance.

Apparently they were told

to get an attorney to be here and make an argument for that, so
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